Missouri Law Review
Volume 46
Issue 4 Fall 1981

Article 9

Fall 1981

Settling Joint Tortfeasor Can Sue for Contribution from
Nonsettling Joint Tortfeasor
Carl E. Schaeperkoetter

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Carl E. Schaeperkoetter, Settling Joint Tortfeasor Can Sue for Contribution from Nonsettling Joint
Tortfeasor, 46 MO. L. REV. (1981)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Schaeperkoetter: Schaeperkoetter: Settling Joint Tortfeasor Can Sue for Contribution
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 46

SETTLING JOINT TORTFEASOR
CAN SUE FOR CONTRIBUTION
FROM NONSETTLING JOINT
TORTFEASOR
Stephenson v. McClure'
Stephenson (P) was a passenger in a car driven by Killian (Dl). This
car collided with one driven by McClure (D2). P sued D1 2 and D2, alleging
eleven negligent acts by each; 3 each defendant denied negligence in his
answer. D2 then cross-claimed against D1, alleging that if both were liable
to P, D1 would be liable to D2 "'by way of contribution' for such part of the
judgment as the jury may determine to have resulted from the negligence
''4
of... [D1].
P later dismissed her claim against D1. P and D2, however, executed a
settlement agreement. In compliance with this agreement, P released all
1. 606 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980).
2. Missouri has no guest statute. Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173, 175
(Mo. En Banc 1969); Griggs v. Riley, 489 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Mo. App., St. L.
1972). Guest statutes normally limit the liability of owners and operators of motor
vehicles, with respect to the injuries suffered by nonpaying passengers in the.same
vehicles, to acts of gross negligence and willful misconduct. See, e.g., IND. CODE
ANN. § 9-3-3-1 (Bums 1980). In recent years, the guest statutes of a number of
states have been declared unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. See,
e.g., Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 882, 506 P.2d 212, 251, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388,
407 (1973); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 762, 518 P.2d 362, 371 (1974). Contra, Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883, 889 (Utah), appeal dismissedfor want of
substantialfederal question, 419 U.S. 810 (1974). See generally Annot., 66
A.L.R.3d 532 (1975).
3. Among the alleged negligent acts were charges of humanitarian
negligence against each defendant. 606 S.W.2d at 209. The "humanitarian" doctrine is the Missouri version of the "last clear chance" doctrine. For an explanation of the humanitarian doctrine, see Coulson, Last Clear ChanceHumanitarianDoctrine in Missouri, 6 K.C. L. REV. 235 (1938); Gaines, The
HumanitarianDoctrinein Missouri,20 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 113 (1935); McCleary,
The Bases of the HumanitarianDoctrineReexamined, 5 Mo. L. REV. 56 (1940);
Rich, The HumanitarianDoctrine Re-Examined, 26J. Mo. B. 38 (1970).
The humanitarian doctrine would become obsolete if Missouri were to adopt
comparative negligence, a move the Missouri Supreme Court has not yet been
willing to make. See Steinman v. Strobel, 589 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Mo. En Banc
1979); Epple v. Western Auto Supply Co., 557 S.W.2d 253, 254 (Mo. En Banc
1977).

4.

606 S.W.2d at 210.
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of her claims against D2. 5 D2 then amended his cross-claim and sought
contribution "'for all or such part, portion or percentage of the amount
paid to ... [P] as corresponded to the part, portion or percentage of fault
for the collision in question as the jury may determine to have resulted
from an act or omission by ...

[Dl]. "6 Dl's administratrix filed a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. The trial court sustained the
motion, but did not explain its decision.
Although the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District affirmed the judgment, the court held that a settling tortfeasor could seek
contribution from another joint tortfeasor.7 D2, however, could not seek
contribution from D1, an alleged joint tortfeasor, because D2 did not
plead his own liability in the petition.8
In extending the right of contribution to the settling tortfeasor, the
court took another step away from the traditional common law rule on
contribution. The traditional rule that was applied in this country prohibited contribution among joint tortfeasors. 9 Each joint tortfeasor was
5. Id. The court of appeals treated this release as a general release, which
discharged anyone's liability to P arising from the incident. At common law, a
release of one joint tortfeasor released all joint tortfeasors. See, e.g., Hubbard v.
St. Louis & M.R.R.R., 173 Mo. 249, 255, 72 S.W. 1073, 1074(1903). To circumvent this rule, attorneys developed the covenant not to sue, by which the plaintiff
did not surrender his cause of action, but merely agreed not to enforce it. W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 301-03 (4th ed. 1971).

Missouri allows a partial release without releasing all joint tortfeasors. RSMO
§ 537.060 (1978). The portion of the statute dealing with releases was enacted
after theHubbardcase. See 1915 Mo. Laws 268 § 1. Any partial release, however,
must be expressed clearly and unmistakably; otherwise, it will be treated as a
general release. Swope v. General Motors Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1222, 1225-26
(W.D. Mo. 1978); Liberty v. J.A. Tobin Constr. Co., 512 S.W.2d 886, 890 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1974). See also Anderson & O'Brien, Recent Developments in
Missouri: Tort Law, 48 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 660, 660-70 (1980).
6. 606 S.W.2d at 210.
7. Id. at 213. The court defined "joint tortfeasor" to "include tortfeasors
whose separate but concurrent negligent acts constitute a cause of the injury in
question." Id. at 211 n.5. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 291-99. The
court defined "contribution" as the right of one party who had satisfied the claim
of a third party to seek partial reimbursement from another party. 606 S.W.2d at
210-11.
8. 606 S.W.2d at 213.
9. The rule had its origins in the English case of Merryweather v. Nixan,
101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). Merryweatherdenied contribution between intentional tortfeasors charged with conversion, but American courts mistakenly
applied the rule to negligence cases as well. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead &
Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Mo. En Banc 1978); W. PROSSER, supranote 5,
at 306; Reath, ContributionBetween PersonsJointly Chargedfor NegligenceMerryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176, 177 (1898); Comment, Conhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/9
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jointly and severally liable; the plaintiff could recover his full award
against any one tortfeasor, 10 even if the plaintiff received a joint judgment
against more than one tortfeasor but chose to execute against only one.'I
That tortfeasor could not recover any of his payment from any other tortfeasor.
By statute, Missouri allowed contribution after the plaintiff secured a
judgment against jointly sued tortfeasors,' 2 but it followed the common
law rule forbidding a sued tortfeasor from seeking contribution from a
joint tortfeasor that the plaintiff had chosen not to sue. In 1978, the
Missouri Supreme Court handed down the landmark decision of Missouri
PacificRailroad v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 13 abrogating the traditional
common law rule. Missouri thereby followed the majority of states in expanding the opportunities for a joint tortfeasor to obtain contribution, but
it did so by case law rather than the more common method of statutory
change.14

Whitehead & Kales, using a rationale of fairness,' 5 held that a joint
tortfeasor could implead a third party tortfeasor to obtain contribution,
even if the plaintiff had not sued the third party.' 6 The trier of fact then
would determine the relative degree of fault among the alleged tortfeasors.
After judgment, the plaintiff still could recover the full amount of the
judgment from any or all joint judgment debtors, thus maintaining several
liability.' 7 Whitehead & Kales, however, allowed the tortfeasor paying the
tributionIn Missouri-Procedureand Defenses Under the New Rule, 44 MO. L.
REV. 691, 693 (1979); Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Whitehead & Kales Co.:
UncertainRenovations, 48 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 54, 55 (1979).
10. Joint and several liability has been and still is the rule in Missouri. See
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466, 474 (Mo. En
Banc 1978); Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 209, 177 S.W. 382, 384 (1915); Murphy v. Wilson, 44 Mo. 313, 322 (1869). For a discussion and suggested modifications of the rule of joint and several liability in Missouri, see Parks v. Union Carbide Corp., 602 S.W.2d 188, 198-201 (Mo. En Banc 1980) (Welliver, J., dissenting).
11. Berry v. St. Louis, M. & S.E.R.R., 214 Mo. 593, 598, 114 S.W. 27, 29
(1908).
12. RSMO § 537.060 (1978). The harshness of the common law rule has
been condemned almost universally by commentators. W. PROSSER, supra note
5, at 307.
13. 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
14. The statutes on contribution in the various states are compiled in Comment, supra note 9, at 694 n.18.
15. 566 S.W.2d at 474. See also Parks v. Union Carbide Corp., 602 S.W.2d
188, 192-95 (Mo. En Banc 1980) (Welliver, J., dissenting).
16. 566 S.W.2d at 474. The plaintiff retains his freedom to sue whomever he
chooses. Id. The Missouri rule on impleader is MO. R. CIV. P. 52.11. See Comment, supra note 9, at 699-701.
17. 566 S.W.2d at 474. Accord, American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 586-89, 578 P.2d 899, 903-07, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 186-90
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
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award a right of contribution for any amount greater than his relative
share. The court also stated in dictum that co-defendants could crossclaim against each other for contribution."' The basis for computing the
distribution of joint liability was relative fault.1 9
Whitehead & Kales established two new rights for tortfeasors in
Missouri: (1) a tortfeasor could bring other tortfeasors not sued by the
plaintiff into the same lawsuit, and (2) the trier of fact could determine
relative fault at the initial trial of the plaintiff's cause of action. The trial
judge, however, could order separate trials for the plaintiff's action and
20
the relative fault question.
(1978). Kansas, unlike Missouri and California, has abandoned joint and several
liability. Each tortfeasor is liable to the plaintiff only for his proportionate share
of fault. Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 204, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (1978).
18. 566 S.W.2d at 473. The Missouri rule on cross-claims is MO. R. CIV. P.
55.32(f).
19. 566 S.W.2d at 473. Relative fault permits the trier of fact to allocate the
percentage of fault among joint tortfeasors, based on the blameworthy conduct of
each tortfeasor. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.
3d 578, 598, 578 P.2d 899, 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 195 (1978); Tolbert v.
Gerber Indus., Inc.,

-

Minn.

-,

-,

255 N.W.2d 362, 367 (1977);

Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 7,114 N.W.2d 105, 107 (1962). Other states use
an equal share system, in which any loss is divided evenly among all tortfeasors,
regardless of relative fault. See, e.g., Moore v. St. Cloud Utils., 337 So. 2d 982,
984 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Celotex Corp. v. Campbell Roofing & Metal
Works, Inc., 352 So. 2d 1316, 1319 (Miss. 1977). The defendants are still jointly
and severally liable to the plaintiff under either approach. See generally note 10
supra.
UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT

§ 2(4) (1939 version)

[hereinafter cited as 1939 UNIFORM ACT] provides an optional section permitting
either approach. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 2 (1955

version) [hereinafter cited as 1955 UNIFORM ACT] adopts the equal share approach. For a listing of which states adopt which approach, see Comment, supra
note 9, at 694 n.18. See generally Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 184 (1973).
20. 566 S.W.2d at 474. Whitehead 8'Kales left unclear whether a tortfeasor
who failed to use the procedural tools available to obtain contribution in the
original action could bring a contribution suit later. A federal district court,
applying Missouri law, has held that the tortfeasor may bring a separate suit. See
Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 475 F. Supp. 679, 681 (E.D. Mo. 1979). Other
states have split on this issue. See, e.g., Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Osier,
Mont.

-.

-,

605 P.2d 1076, 1079 (1979) (defendant cannot use im-

pleader to bring in third party for contribution; no right to contribution unless
there has been joint judgment); Lipson v. Gewirtz, 70 Misc. 2d 599, 604, 334
N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (1972) (separate action may be brought by tortfeasor).
An argument in favor of allowing a subsequent suit is that the alleged joint
tortfeasor still has an opportunity to litigate the issue of negligence, the same
argument accepted by the Stephenson court for the settling tortfeasor. See note
26 and accompanying text infra. An argument against allowing a subsequent
contribution suit by a judgment tortfeasor is that it "adds to the burden of already
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/9
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Although the right of a joint tortfeasor to seek contribution was in-

tended to extend beyond the facts of Whitehead & Kales,2 ' several problems with the application of the new contribution doctrine were not
discussed. For example, the opinion did not indicate a solution to the contribution problem when one alleged joint tortfeasor settles with the plaintiff.
In Stephenson, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District
suggested a solution to this problem and discussed two major issues. 2 The
crowded courts, creates the possibility of inconsistent verdicts in the two actions
and makes more difficult the assessment of equitable shares in multi-party situations in which one of three or more wrongdoers is not joined in the initial action."
Meckley v. Hertz Corp., 88 Misc. 2d 605, 609, 388 N.Y.S.2d 555, 557 (1976).
The 1955 UNIFORM ACT, supra note 19, § 3(a) allows contribution to be
sought in a subsequent suit. The 1939 UNIFORM ACT, supra note 19, § 7(3) would
allow contribution in an independent action only when there was no opportunity
to bring the joint tortfeasor into the original suit. "[T]he vast majority of states
which allow contribution allow it to be brought either in the original plaintiff's
action or in an indpendent action." Appel &Michael, ContributionAmongJoint
Tortfeasorsin Illinois:An Opportunityfor Legislative andJudicial Cooperation,
10 LoY. CHI. L.J. 169, 193 (1979).
21. 566 S.W.2d at 474.
22. A third issue mentioned briefly by the court was the distinction between
contribution and indemnity. Contribution is normally considered to be a claim
for partial reimbursement; indemnity is a claim for full reimbursement. 606
S.W.2d at 210-11. The theoretical origins of the two are distinct. Contribution is
based on the purely equitable consideration of sharing a loss jointly caused; indemnity is based on either a contractual theory or a difference in kind or quality
of the acts of the parties. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 310-13. The most common indemnity situation involving a difference in quality of the acts of the parties
is the right of the employer who is vicariously liable to seek indemnity from his
employee for any judgment rendered against the employer. See State ex rel.
Algiere v. Russell, 359 Mo. 800, 803, 223 S.W.2d 481, 483 (En Banc 1949); Elzea
v. Hammack, 241 Mo. App. 1070, 1083, 244 S.W.2d 594, 603 (St. L. 1951).
Another form of noncontractual indemnity used by Missouri courts was the
active-passive negligence test, which allowed a "passively" negligent tortfeasor to
seek indemnity while denying indemnity to the "actively" negligent tortfeasor.
See Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d at 470 (cases
cited). The test, devised as a method to alleviate the rule against contribution
among joint tortfeasors, was abandoned in Whitehead & Kales. The court found
the test depended more on "characterization" than on equitable fairness between
the parties. Id. at 472. Accord, Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 148-49,
282 N.E.2d 288, 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387 (1972). The court's ruling did not
affect the right to contractual indemnity or indemnity by reason of vicarious
liability. 566 S.W.2d at 468 n.2. Cf. Parks v. Union Carbide Corp., 602 S.W.2d
188, 190 (Mo. En Banc 1980) (terms of contract not sufficiently clear to show intent to indemnify). For a general discussion of the active-passive test, see Comment, Products Liability-Non-contractualIndemnity-The Effect of the
Active-Passive Negligence Theory in Missouri, 41 MO. L. REV. 382, 385-91
(1976).
Published
by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981

5

1981]

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 4 [1981], Art. 9
RECENT CASES

first major issue that the court addressed was the right of the settling tortfeasor to seek contribution. Allowance of this right encourages the settlement of cases, and public policy favors settlement. 23 The usual reasons
given for this policy are that settlement avoids the costs of litigation,
prevents congestion in the court docket, and allows a mutually agreeable
solution to be obtained by the parties. 24 The denial of contribution to a settling tortfeasor could discourage the impetus to settle. The tortfeasor
would be more likely to await a judgment, hoping for a judgment in his
favor or seeking contribution if he was found liable.
An argument that has been made against allowing the settling tortfeasor contribution is that it is fundamentally unfair to hold a third party
tortfeasor liable for part of a settlement over which he had no control. 25
The Stephenson court rejected that argument, stating:
A joint tortfeasor thus called upon to discharge his equitable
responsibility to his cotortfeasor who has settled the common
liability with the injured person is not prejudiced by the fact that
judgment has not first been entered in favor of the person injured.
The joint tortfeasor from whom contribution is sought will still
have his day in court to defend against liability and the
reasonableness of the amount paid in settlement of the existing
26
claim.
Although not explicitly stated, Stephenson may require the settling
tortfeasor to grant a general release before he can seek contribution. In
assuming that P's release was a general release, the court avoided the question of what the result would be if there were only a partial release or cove27
nant not to sue.
The requirement of a general release would avoid a number of potential problems. First, to allow a settling tortfeasor to seek contribution from
one who has not been released would put the other tortfeasor in the unenviable position of potentially defending two suits: one for contribution and
23. See, e.g., Libertyv.J.A. Tobin Constr. Co., 512 S.W.2d 886, 890 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1974); State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n, 483 S.W.2d 783, 785
(Mo. App., St. L. 1972); Mateer v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 105 Mo. 320, 354, 16 S.W.
839, 848 (En Banc 1891).
24. See Comment, Settlements in Multiple Tortfeasor Controversies-Texas Law, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 75, 75-76 (1978).
25. 606 S.W.2d at 212.
26. Id. (quoting 18 AM. JUR. 2d Contribution§ 51 (1965)). See Brockman
, 567 P.2d 1281, 1283 (1977);
Mobile Home Sales v. Lee, 98 Idaho 530,
Samuelson v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 287 Minn. 264, 270, 178 N.W.2d 620,
624 (1970); Swartz v. Sunderland, 403 Pa. 222, 226, 169 A.2d 289, 291 (1961).
27. 606 S.W.2d at 210 n.1. The language the court quotes implies that a
general release is required: "'[O]ne of several tortfeasors ... may in good faith
enter into a compromise with the injured person and satisfy the entire liability....
A joint tortfeasor ... who has settled the common liabilityis not prejudiced by...
[the absence of a judgment].' " 606 S.W.2d at 212 (quoting 18 AM. JUR. 2d Contribution § 51 (1965) (emphasis added)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/9
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the other against the plaintiff for the original injury.2 8 This result defeats
the Whitehead & Kales justification for contribution: fairness. 29
A second problem that might arise without a general release would be
determining each joint tortfeasor's share. A joint tortfeasor can recover
only payments over his proportionate share of the joint liability.8 0 Without
a general release, the liability amount could not be determined until the
plaintiff brought suit against the co-tortfeasor, 3' gave a general release, or
3 2
allowed the statute of limitations to run.
The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (1955 version) 33
solves these potential problems by requiring a general release before contribution can be sought by the settling tortfeasor.3 4 Under the Act, the set28. See, e.g., Lubbock Mfg. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 584
S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (denying contribution to settling tortfeasor in absence of general release).
29. 566 S.W.2d at 472.
30. Id. at 474. See note 19 supra.
31. A problem arising when the plaintiff sues one joint tortfeasor after
settlement with another joint tortfeasor concerns the effect of the settlement on
the plaintiff's subsequent judgment against the second tortfeasor. Some states
provide a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the plaintiff's judgment against the
nonsettling tortfeasor. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court,
20 Cal. 3d 578, 604, 578 P.2d 899, 916, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 199 (1978); Bradley
v. Appalachian Power Co., -. W. Va.
,.....
256 S.E.2d 879, 887 (1979).
This approach has been criticized as inequitable by one Missouri judge who
would reduce the subsequent judgment by the proportion of the fault of the settling tortfeasor. See Parks v. Union Carbide Corp., 602 S.W.2d 188, 203-04 (Mo.
En Banc 1980) (Welliver, J., dissenting). Accord, Cartel Capital Corp..v. Fireco,
81 N.J. 548, 569, 410 A.2d 674, 685 (1980).
32. The Missouri statute of limitations for tort actions is five years. RSMO §
516.120(4) (1978). It has been held in contribution cases that the statute of
limitations begins to run in Missouri at the time of settlement, not at the time of
the original accident. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 475 F. Supp. 679, 681
(E.D. Mo. 1979). Accord, Evans v. Lukas, 140 Ga. App. 182, 184, 230 S.E.2d
136, 138 (1976); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schara, 56 Wis. 2d 262,
264-65, 201 N.W.2d 758, 759 (1972). Cf. Simon v. Kansas City Rug Co., 460
S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo. 1970) (statute begins to run when judgment entered
against one joint tortfeasor and he has paid more than his proportionate share of
joint judgment). The result is that a contribution suit conceivably could be
brought after the statute would have run for the plaintiffs original action. The
Gray holding has been criticized in Zpevak, Beware: New Dangersof PartialSettlements in Multiple Defendant Cases, 36 J. Mo.B. 235, 237, 240 (1980). In
order to prevent contribution suits long after the incident causing the liability,
the 1955 UNIFORM ACT, supra note 19, would apply a one year statute of limitations for these suits after judgment on the plaintiffs claim, id. § 3(c), or agreement to settlement a pending claim, id. I 3(d)(2).
33. See note 19 supra.
34. A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not
entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
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tling tortfeasor is discharged from liability for contribution to any other
tortfeasor, regardless of the type of release. 35 Thus the plaintiff retains his
cause of action against other tortfeasors if he chooses not to give a general
release; at all times the settling tortfeasor is protected from claims for contribution. In the case of a general release, any other joint tortfeasors are
protected from suit by the plaintiff, while still having the opportunity in
the contribution suit to contest their negligence and the reasonableness of
the settlement.3 6 In the case of a nongeneral release, any other tortfeasors
would be immune from contribution to the settling tortfeasor.
The second major issue in Stephenson was the pleading requirement to
obtain contribution. The new requirement established that a settling tortfeasor must plead his own liability to have a cause of action for contribution.3 7 The court reasoned that 'contribution requires a joint liability of
tortfeasors to the plaintiff, but when there has been a settlement, no
judicial determination of the liability of the settling tortfeasor is possible.
To meet the requirement of joint liability, the settling tortfeasor must adfor the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor
in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what
was reasonable.
1955 UNIFORM ACT, supra note 19, § 1.(d).
While most states that have adopted either the 1939 or 1955 version of the

uniform act hold that the release must be general before the settling tortfeasor
can seek contribution, see, e.g., Best Sanitary Disposal Co. v. Little Food Town,
Inc., 339 So. 2d 222, 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Bartels v. City of Williston,
276 N.W.2d 113, 122 (N.D. 1979), there is authority for the view that contribution may be obtained in one instance under the uniform act by a settling tortfeasor who has received only a partial release: when damages in the subsequent
judgment against the other joint tortfeasor are for less than the settlement figure.
The liability of the other joint tortfeasor to the plaintiff, therefore, has been extinguished by the settlement. See Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa. Super. Ct. 68,
72-73, 186 A.2d 427, 429 (1962).
35. 1955 UNIFORM ACT, supranote 19, § 4(b). This rule has been suggested
for adoption in Missouri; the rationale is to encourage settlement. See Parks v.
Union Carbide Corp., 602 S.W.2d 188, 202 (Mo. En Banc 1980) (Welliver, J.,
dissenting). Contra, Bisaccio v. Brown, 366 So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (general release does not absolve either party from proportionate liability to
third party).
Missouri courts have not yet ruled on whether the settling tortfeasor may be
liable for contribution. The problem has been addressed by several commentators. See Anderson & O'Brien, supra note 5, at 664-66; Milholland, Settle by
Covenant to Sue?, 35J. Mo. B. 168 (1979); Zpevak, More on Settle by Covenant
to Sue?, 35J. Mo. B. 323 (1979); Zpevak, supra note 32; Comment, supranote 9,
at 716-19; U.M.K.C. L. REV., supra note 9, at 61-64.
36. The burden of proving the reasonableness of the settlement usually is
placed on the settling tortfeasor. See, e.g., W.D. Rubright Co. v. International
Harvester Co., 358 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Youngv. Steinberg, 53
NJ. 252, 255, 250 A.2d 13, 14 (1969).
37. 606 S.W.2d at 213.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss4/9
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mit his liability.38 This admission also has been required in other jurisdic-

tions.3 9
Because of the Stephenson decision, Missouri's pleading requirements
for a settling joint tortfeasor differ from those for a joint tortfeasor whose
liability will be determined by judgment. The settling tortfeasor must
plead his own liability to seek contribution.40 When the trier of fact determines relative fault at the same time the plaintiffs action is tried, however,
the alleged tortfeasor need not plead his own liability. Instead, he may
plead that the trier of fact make a determination of relative fault only after
finding the alleged tortfeasors jointly liable. 41 In other words, the tortfeasor may plead in the alternative if the contribution issue is determined
42
by the same trier of fact hearing the plaintiffs case.
The settling tortfeasor in Stephenson argued that to plead his own
liability would prejudice his defense in other actions arising from the same
accident. The court held this was an unavoidable risk attendant to the
right of contribution: 43 The danger in pleading liability is that an admission in a pleading in one action may be received in evidence against the

38. Id. Cf. Lane v. Geiger-Berger Assocs., 608 F.2d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir.
1979) (relative fault instruction not applicable in suit involving construction contract where subcontractor and structural engineer were not joint tortfeasors).
39. See, e.g., Allied Mut. Cas. Co. v. Long, 252 Iowa 829,835,107 N.W.2d
682, 685 (1961); Paisley v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 38 Mich. App. 450,455-56,
196 N.W.2d 813, 815-16 (1972).
40. See notes 37 & 38 and accompanying text supra.
41. The Stephenson court implicitly recognized this point by contrasting
Allied Mut. Cas. Co. v. Long, 252 Iowa 829, 107 N.W.2d 682 (1961) with Fane v.
Hootman, 254 Iowa 241, 117 N.W.2d 435 (1962). See 606 S.W.2d at 213-14. In
Fane, the Iowa Supreme Court held that a defendant seeking contribution when
the principal case was pending was required to plead only that contribution be
permitted if the trier of fact found both defendants joint tortfeasors. 254 Iowa at
246-47, 117 N.W.2d at 438. The Stephenson court, while following the Long rule
in requiring a pleading of liability by the settling tortfeasor, did not reject the rule
in Fane. Instead Fane was distinguished factually. 606 S.W.2d at 214.
42. Mo. R. CIV. P. 55.10 permits pleading in the alternative. If there is to
be a separate trial for contribution after a judicial determination of liability to
the plaintiff, see note 20 and accompanying text supra, the tortfeasor seeking
contribution logically should be required to plead his 6wn liability. A statement
of common liability in the pleading would do no further damage to the tortfeasor
seeking contribution since judgment already has been rendered against him. It
would make it clear to the trier of fact in the second trial that the party seeking
contribution is a tortfeasor. Common liability to the original plaintiff is a requisite for contribution. See Martinez v. Lankster, 595 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Mo. App.,
E.D. 1980).

43. 606 S.W.2d at 213. Pleading his own liability benefits the settling tortfeasor in one sense; he does not have to offer any evidence of his own negligence in
the contribution action. See Samuelson v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 287 Minn.
264, 269, 178 N.W.2d 620, 624 n.9 (1970).
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pleader in another action as the admission of a party opponent. 4 4 Thus, a
settling tortfeasor, in choosing whether to seek contribution, should consider whether there is any potential liability to persons who have not yet
brought any legal action.
Another area of concern, pertaining to contribution after either settlement or judgment, is that the plaintiff must have a cause of action against
the alleged joint tortfeasor from whom contribution is sought. Missouri
courts have denied contribution when an immunity doctrine would bar
direct action by the plaintiff against the alleged joint tortfeasor. 45 Thus,
the settling tortfeasor's opportunity to seek contribution will be denied if
an immunity doctrine protects the other tortfeasor.
Stephenson clarifies an important aspect of the expanding Missouri
law on contribution by its explicit holding that a settling tortfeasor can
seek contribution if he pleads his own liability. The case leaves unclear
whether a general release is required before contribution can be sought.
Such a requirement could avoid several potential problems. 46 The requirement to plead liability may have future consequences of which the practicing attorney should be aware. 4 7 Stephenson solves only one of many problems of the post- Whitehead & Kales era: the settling tortfeasor who seeks
contribution. In Missouri, a state abandoning a traditional common law
rule by judicial decision, each new situation must be considered in light of
the general principles of fairness enunciated in Whitehead & Kales.
CARL E. SCHAEPERKOETTER

44. See Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 14-15 (8th Cir. 1964); Simmons v. Kansas CityJockey Club, 334 Mo. 99, 107, 66 S.W.2d 119, 122 (1933);
Littell v. Bi-State Transit Dev. Agency, 423 S.W.2d 34, 39 (Mo. App., St. L.
1967); Bowman v. Globe Steam Heating Co., 80 Mo. App. 628, 636 (St. L. 1899).
45. See Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Henningsen Steel Prods. Co., 612 F.2d
363, 367 (8th Cir. 1980) (workmen's compensation immunity from tort liability);
State ex rel. Maryland Heights Concrete Contractors, Inc. v. Ferriss, 588 S.W.2d
489, 490 (Mo. En Banc 1979) (same); Kohler v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 600 S.W.2d
647, 650 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980) (parental immunity would bar contribution);
Renfrow v. Gojohn, 600 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980) (spousal immunity); Martinez v. Lankster, 595 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Mo. App., E.D. 1980) (same).
But see MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Howard Constr. Co., 608 S.W.2d 535, 538 (Mo.
App., W.D. 1980) (parental immunity ends at death; defendant could seek contribution from estate of deceased parent of plaintiff). Cf. Potter v. St. Louis-S.F.
Ry., 622 F.2d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 1980) (permitting contribution claim against
spouse of plaintiff for accident occurring in Missouri; applying Michigan law,
which abolished spousal immunity in conflict of laws case).
46. See notes 27-36 and accompanying text supra.
47. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
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